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Abstract
In a 2016 acceptance speech during the Black Entertainment
Television (BET) Awards, actor and activist Jesse Williams used the
phrase “gentrifying our genius” to refer to the insidious process of
misappropriating the cultural and artistic productions of Black
creators, inventors, and innovators. In that speech, he poignantly
and unapologetically condemned racial discrimination and cultural
misappropriation. This Article chronicles the nefarious history of
the creative disempowerment of creators of color and then imagines
an empowering future for those who successfully exploit their
creations by fully leveraging copyright ownership and transfer
termination. To that end, I reference the considerable scholarship
of Professor K.J. Greene, which explores and challenges cultural
misappropriation of Black musicians and composers, and build
upon my own scholarship that explores the copyright transfer
termination right as a potential legal tool for social and economic
justice for creatives of color. I also reference an empirical study
titled U.S. Copyright Termination Notices 1977–2020: Introducing
New Datasets, to explore data and extrapolations regarding likely
impacts of § 203 terminations since 2013.
In this Article, I explore the paths of artists who leveraged
* Professor, Penn State Dickinson Law. B.S., Northwestern University; J.D. (Dean’s List),
Howard University School of Law (cum laude; editor-in-chief, Howard Law Journal). I thank my
colleagues for comments and critiques and Phyillis Macharia for invaluable research assistant
contributions to this Article.
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opportunity through assignments and licenses and, later, artists who
exercised their termination rights to secure a better deal with the
original transferee, terminated and entered into contracts with other
transferees, or went it alone and exploited their copyrights on their
own. The termination right clearly benefits all copyright creators;
however, members of marginalized and disenfranchised
communities may stand to benefit even more from the second bite of
the copyright apple.
I assert that utilizing blockchain’s
decentralized technology, smart contracts, and non-fungible token
standards can better protect Black artists against
disenfranchisement at the hands of a codified system of intentional
friction to discourage or deny the reclamation of rights.
Accordingly, in Part II, I examine the history in America and
throughout the African diaspora of cultural misappropriation and
critique the gentrification of Black creative genius. I explore
gentrification as it is applied more broadly to real property and then
discuss its application to intellectual property, generally, and
copyright specifically.
In Part III, I discuss the subject matter of copyright protection
and the nature and mechanics of the transfer termination right.
Specifically, I examine the history, purpose, and congressional
intent of the right, as well as the method and the complexities of
timing of notice and termination.
In Part IV, I examine the pre-window fervor and speculation of
stakeholder commentators around the likely impact of § 203
terminations prior to 2013. I examine the actual impact since 2013
and a forecast of likely trends, as described in the termination
notices study, written by Joshua Yuvaraj, Rebecca Giblin, Daniel
Russo-Batterham & Genevieve Grant.
Finally, in Part V, I discuss the role that blockchain technology,
smart contract code, and non-fungible token standards could play
in automating codified protections. Removing the educational and
legalistic barriers to exercising one’s termination rights and
automating the transfer termination process could ensure that all
650

[Vol. 49: 649, 2022]

De-Gentrified Black Genius
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

artists
have
actual—not
theoretical—rights,
especially
disenfranchised creatives victimized first by powerful industry
intermediaries and then by the copyright regime created by those
same industry stakeholders (and blessed by Congress) to protect
industry, rather than creator, interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2016 acceptance speech during the Black Entertainment Television
(BET) Awards, actor and activist Jesse Williams used the phrase “gentrifying
our genius” to refer to the insidious process of misappropriating the cultural
and artistic productions of Black creators, inventors, and innovators.1 In that
speech, he poignantly and unapologetically condemned racial discrimination
and cultural misappropriation:
We’ve been floating this country on credit for centuries, yo,
and we’re done watching and waiting while this invention
called whiteness uses and abuses us, burying [B]lack people
out of sight and out of mind while extracting our culture, our
dollars, our entertainment like oil—black gold, ghettoizing
and demeaning our creations then stealing them, gentrifying
our genius and then trying us on like costumes before
discarding our bodies like rinds of strange fruit. The thing
is though . . . the thing is that just because we’re magic
doesn’t mean we’re not real.2
Those three power-filled words, “gentrifying our genius,” not only
confronted the atrocities of creative despoilment committed by those who
seek to perpetuate the social construct of whiteness,3 but they also amplified
the incalculable intrinsic value of diasporic cultural contributions. His entire
speech also shined a bright light on the dark history of devaluating Black
artistry and the simultaneous systemic misappropriation and hyper-

1. See Megan Lasher, Read the Full Transcript of Jesse Williams’ Powerful Speech on Race at
the BET Awards, TIME (June 27, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://time.com/4383516/jesse-williams-betspeech-transcript/ (noting that on June 27, 2016, Grey’s Anatomy star and Black Lives Matter activist
Jesse Williams delivered a speech at the Black Entertainment Television (BET) Awards to accept
BET’s Humanitarian Award); see also Katie Rogers, How Jesse Williams Stole BET Awards with
Speech
on
Racism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/arts/television/bet-awards-jesse-williams.html?_r=0.
2. 2016 BET Humanitarian Award Speech, GENIUS (June 26, 2016) (emphasis added),
https://genius.com/Jesse-williams-2016-bet-humanitarian-award-speech-annotated (providing a
transcript of Jesse Williams’s speech at the 2016 BET Awards).
3. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)
(explaining how the concept of race was engineered and how the concept of whiteness became
weaponized and “propertized”).
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monetization of the same.4 Both jeered and revered in the same moment.5
Given the value placed in the United States on property ownership of all kinds
as a matter of holding power within society, the ability of historically
marginalized people to create, own, and monetize intellectual property in an
increasingly digital society is inextricably linked to economic empowerment
in the future of wealth.6
Property ownership has been linked to personhood itself.7 Copyright
ownership (and its constitutional twin, patent) was deemed so valuable that
the Intellectual Property Clause is the only clause to express its intention
clearly.8 Despite impassioned argument and debate over a range of topics at
the Constitutional Convention, the Intellectual Property Clause passed
“without debate or controversy.”9 Although the Copyright Act focuses more
on ownership than authorship, as the Act evolved over time, one way that
Congress sought to empower creators to create the transfer termination right
in 1976 was to replace the initial and renewal periods of copyright
protection.10
Owners of copyrighted works created on or after January 1, 1978, were
first empowered to begin terminating any transfers of those works on January
4. See generally Rogers, supra note 1 (reporting Jesse Williams’s speech, in which he speaks of
white culture misappropriating Black artists’ cultural contributions). Professor K.J. Greene examines
this pattern in American popular music of bursts of “Black musical innovation and communal creation,
followed by dominant culture copying or imitation and appropriation.” K.J. Greene, Copyright,
Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 339,
371 (1998). Professor Greene asserts that this pattern was particularly pronounced in musical genres
like jazz and the blues. Id. at 371–72.
5. See Greene, supra note 4, at 368 (“[T]here exist clear patterns of economic exploitation and
cultural distortion of the work and forms of minority creators. A strikingly consistent characteristic
of cultural appropriation is its one-way direction—white performers obtaining economic and artistic
benefits at the expense of minority innovators.”).
6. See id. at 344 (acknowledging that “[o]wnership of property has long been central to the
American experience, and vital to success, status and prosperity in America”).
7. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (discussing
the relationship between property and personhood). See generally Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory
of Intellectual Property Revisited, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1069 (2012).
8. See 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1.01 (1991). The Intellectual Property
Clause, found in Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the U.S. Constitution, states that the purpose
of the copyright and patent monopolies is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. See Greene, supra note 4, at 346 (citing Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929)).
10. See Tonya M. Evans, Statutory Heirs Apparent?: Reclaiming Copyright in the Age of AuthorControlled, Author-Benefitting Transfers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 297, 308 (2016) (“The 1976 Copyright
Act, which took effect on January 1, 1978, replaced the two-term system of the 1909 Act with a single
term that endured for the life of the author, plus 50 years after the author’s death.”).
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1, 2013.11 But for the termination right, an artist’s rights to literary and artistic
works would be forever subject to the control of the original transferee.12 The
copyright transfer termination right is a powerful inalienable, nonwaivable
right held by all copyright creators to terminate any lifetime transfer of
copyright decades after transfer.13 However, it seems especially powerful for
artists of color who have historically been forced, hoodwinked, and cajoled
into parting with all dominion and control over their literary and artistic
productions or who were simply unaware of their rights and, therefore, did not
fully understand or appreciate the potential value of the rights at issue or the
worth of their creations.14
The transfer termination right permits authors who transferred ownership
of their copyrights, perhaps early in their career, without the benefit of
knowing its true value, to reclaim control of, and to monetize, their work
beginning thirty-five years after the transfer.15 This inalienable, nonwaivable
right to divest a transferee of the copyright transfer, however, is not
automatic.16 To exercise the right, an author must know of the right’s
existence and carefully manage the morass of rules regarding the opening of
the notice period and timely and effective delivery of notice to the correct
parties.17 Failure to walk this procedural tightrope successfully and within the
statutorily prescribed period has significant consequences because the
termination right is “use it or lose it.”18
Victor Willis, a Black man, original member of the Village People, and
songwriter of the evergreen karaoke hit Y.M.C.A., is the first artist of any race
to successfully terminate the transfer of a post-1977 copyrighted musical
composition under § 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act.19 Willis may have been
11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 203(a)(3).
12. See Evans, supra note 10 (“[The new approach] reflected the reality that copyright creators
often have little bargaining power in comparison to corporate assignees.”).
13. See id. (footnote omitted) (“In response, Congress made explicitly clear in the 1976 Act and
again in the 1998 amendment that termination rights are inalienable and unwaivable.”).
14. See Greene, supra note 4, at 368 (“The treatment of Black artists by the music industry and the
copyright system reveals a pervasive history of infringement.”).
15. See § 203(a)(3) (“Termination of the grant may be effected . . . beginning at the end of thirtyfive years from the date of execution of the grant.”).
16. See § 203(a) (“Conditions for Termination”).
17. See id. (describing the rules authors must follow).
18. See § 203(b)(6) (“Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant, if it
does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the term of copyright provided by this title.”).
19. See Eriq Gardner, Village People Songwriter Victor Willis Wins Case over Termination of
‘Y.M.C.A.’
Rights,
HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(May
8,
2012,
10:32
AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/village-people-ymca-lawsuit-victor-willis-321576
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the first, but since 2013, artists from all entertainment industry sectors have
served transfer termination notices that were thought, at the time of contract
by all parties, to be irrevocable and perpetual.20 “The list of successful artists
includes the late Prince Rogers Nelson (aka Prince), who, after an infamous
and legendary 18-year rights battle, reclaimed his music catalog from Warner
Brothers beginning with his debut album released in 1978.”21 And most
recently, rhythm and blues mega-songstress Anita Baker announced on
Twitter that all of her “children” were coming home.22 After engaging in a
contentious rights tug-of-war with her recording company, she successfully
reclaimed all her masters under decades-old contracts.23
By knowing of, and effectively exercising, their copyright transfer
termination rights, Willis, Prince, and Baker all avoided the devastating
financial, emotional, psychological, and generational consequences of
gentrified genius that Williams spoke of as he accepted the 2016 BET
Humanitarian Award.24 These artistic and business titans exercised their
termination power in the full-throated manner of the Black Power movement
of the 1960s.25 They achieved what so many creators of color could not or did
(discussing Victor Willis’s successful termination notice). Willis reclaimed a 50% share of the
copyright in twenty-four Village People songs. See Eriq Gardner, Jury Decides Village People
‘Y.M.C.A.’ Songwriter Has 50 Percent Song Share, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:39 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/jury-decides-village-people-ymca779420/.
20. See Evans, supra note 10, at 300.
21. Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 300 n.10 (citations omitted) (“Musical icon, producer,
singer/songwriter, and performer, Prince Rogers Nelson, was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota on June
7, 1958. He died in his home, known as Paisley Park, of an apparent drug overdose on April 21, 2016.
His parents, who predeceased him, were both musicians. He had no spouse or descendants. He also
died intestate, joining Amy Winehouse, Sonny Bono, and Steve McNair as mega stars with considerable fortunes who died without a will. For an in-depth critical study of Prince’s life and artistry, see
generally TOURÉ, I WOULD DIE 4 U: WHY PRINCE BECAME AN ICON (2013).”).
22. Anita Baker (@IAMANITABAKER), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2021, 10:48 AM), https://twitter.com/iamanitabaker/status/1433849361406910465?lang=en.
23. See Matthew Allen, Anita Baker Settles Dispute over Her Master Recordings, THEGRIO (Sept.
4, 2021), https://thegrio.com/2021/09/04/anita-gets-masters/; see also Baker, supra note 22 (showing
her iconic albums The Songstress, Rapture, Giving You the Best That I Got, Compositions, and Rhythm
of Love).
24. See Veronica Toney, Jesse Williams Gave One of the Most Memorable Speeches in Award
Show History [Full Transcript], WASH. POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/06/27/jesse-williams-gave-one-of-the-mostmemorable-speeches-in-award-show-history-full-transcript/ (“Gentrifying our genius and then trying
us on like costumes before discarding our bodies like rinds of strange fruit.”).
25. See generally Leland Ware, Civil Rights and the 1960s: A Decade of Unparalleled Progress,
72 MD. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2013) (discussing the 1960s and delving into “the events that propelled
African Americans from segregation to full citizenship”).
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not do: they reclaimed control of their creativity and thereby recentered
themselves in economic power grounded in property ownership in the United
States.26
This Article chronicles the nefarious history of the creative
disempowerment of creators of color and then imagines an empowering future
for those who successfully exploit their creations by fully leveraging
copyright ownership and transfer termination.27 I include those who leveraged
opportunity through assignments and licenses, and later, those who exercised
their termination rights to secure a better deal with the original transferee,
terminated and entered into deals with other transferees, or went it alone and
exploited their copyrights on their own.28 The termination right clearly
benefits all copyright creators; however, members of marginalized and
disenfranchised communities may stand to benefit even more from the second
bite of the copyright apple.29 I assert that utilizing blockchain’s decentralized
technology, smart contracts, and non-fungible token standards can better
protect Black artists against disenfranchisement at the hands of a codified
system of intentional friction to discourage or deny the reclamation of rights.30
Accordingly, in Part II, I examine the history in America and throughout
the African diaspora of cultural misappropriation and critique the
gentrification of Black creative genius. I explore gentrification as it is applied
more broadly to real property and then discuss its application to intellectual
property, generally, and copyright specifically.31
26. See Evans, supra note 10, at 299–300 (acknowledging artists who successfully served transfer
termination notices). Prince followed in the footsteps of Victor Willis, who was “the first living artist
to successfully terminate the transfer of a post-1977 copyrighted musical composition.” Id. at 299
(discussing Victor Willis).
27. See Greene, supra note 4, at 356–57 (footnote omitted) (“Blacks as a class received less protection for artistic musical works due to (1) inequalities of bargaining power, (2) the clash between
the structural elements of copyright law and the oral predicate of Black culture, and (3) broad and
pervasive social discrimination which both devalued Black contributions to the arts and created greater
vulnerability to exploitation and appropriation of creative works.”).
28. See Evans, supra note 10, at 299–300 (discussing artists, like Willis and Prince, exercising
their termination rights to reclaim their creative work).
29. See generally Greene, supra note 4, at 387 (footnote omitted) (“Since copyright is a form of
wealth, the pattern of creation by Blacks and appropriation of the fruits of Black performers by the
dominant group—whites in America—comprised a wealth transfer away from the Black community.”).
30. See Ilker Koksal, The Benefits of Applying Blockchain Technology in Any Industry, FORBES
(Oct. 23, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/10/23/the-benefits-of-applying-blockchain-technology-in-any-industry/?sh=7e7a44f849a5 (“With its decentralized and trustless nature, Blockchain technology can lead to new opportunities and benefit businesses through
greater transparency, enhanced security, and easier traceability.”).
31. See infra Part II.
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In Part III, I discuss the subject matter of copyright protection and the
nature and mechanics of the transfer termination right. Specifically, I examine
the history, purpose, and congressional intent of the right, as well as the
method and the complexities of timing of notice and termination.32
In Part IV, I examine the pre-window fervor and speculation of
stakeholder commentators around the likely impact of § 203 terminations
prior to 2013. I examine the actual impact since 2013 and a forecast of likely
trends, as described in the Termination Notices study.33
Finally, in Part V, I discuss the role that blockchain technology, smart
contract code, and non-fungible token standards could play in automating
codified protections. Removing the educational and legalistic barriers to
exercising one’s termination rights and automating the transfer termination
process could ensure that all artists have actual—not theoretical—rights,
especially disenfranchised creatives victimized first by powerful industry
intermediaries and then by the copyright regime created by those same
industry stakeholders (and blessed by Congress) to protect industry, rather
than creator, interests.34
II. THE HISTORY OF CULTURAL GENTRIFICATION
In this Part, I examine the history in America and throughout the African
diaspora of cultural misappropriation and critique the gentrification of Black
creative genius.35 I explore gentrification as it is applied more broadly to real
property and then discuss its application to intellectual property generally and
copyright specifically.36
32. See infra Part III.
33. See Joshua Yuvaraj, Rebecca Giblin, Daniel Russo-Batterham & Genevieve Grant, U.S. Copyright Termination Notices 1977–2020: Introducing New Datasets, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (discussing likely impacts of § 203 terminations); see also infra Part IV.
34. See Greene, supra note 4, at 378 (discussing the historic victimization of Black artists who
received “no economic reward for their creations” because they were not adequately protected by
termination rights).
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part II. See generally Gentrifying Genius: Urban Creators Stripped Bare, SXSW
SCHEDULE (Mar. 14, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://schedule.sxsw.com/2017/03/14/events/type/panel
(documenting a discussion on gentrification). On March 14, 2017, I served on a panel at South by
Southwest (SxSW) titled “Gentrifying Genius: Urban Creators Stripped Bare.” See id. Panelists
explored the themes raised in an article published by the Fader titled Black Teens Are Breaking the
Internet and Seeing None of the Profits. Doreen St. Felix, Black Teens Are Breaking the Internet and
Seeing None of the Profits, FADER (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.thefader.com/2015/12/03/on-fleekpeaches-monroee-meechie-viral-vines. The article explained that, unlike their white counterparts,
Black and brown youth—particularly those who are economically disadvantaged—often miss fruitful

658

[Vol. 49: 649, 2022]

De-Gentrified Black Genius
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

German-British sociologist and city planner Ruth Glass is credited with
coining the term gentrification in 1964.37 She describes the process as slow
but deliberate: “One by one, many of the working class quarters of London
have been invaded by the middle classes . . . . Larger Victorian houses
downgraded in an earlier or recent period . . . upgraded once again.”38 Once
this process of gentrification is set in motion, explains Glass, it continues
“until all or most of the working-class occupiers are displaced, and the whole
social character of the district is changed.”39
The term refers to the process of developers buying real estate in
economically distressed or blighted areas—usually urban housing—and
developing the area.40 While some commentators view gentrification as
beneficial to displaced poor, marginalized populations,41 gentrification often
increases property values to levels so high that poor residents can no longer
afford to live in that area.42 Rising property values deprive low-income, poor
residents of affordable housing and may even force residents into residential
insecurity.43
In sum, gentrification homogenizes the area; creates opportunity zones
and tax incentives to renovate real properties, develop green space, expand
employment, educational, and commercial opportunities; and raises the tax
base to further develop and support the development.44 At first blush, these
are all laudable and desirable outcomes.45 However, in the process existing
residents and businesses in the area are eventually priced out of opportunities
and ultimately life-changing opportunities to fully leverage creativity in the online environment that
becomes popular (even viral) but nevertheless goes uncompensated and not properly attributed to
them. Id.
37. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING 198 (Willem van Vliet ed., 1998).
38. RUTH GLASS ET AL., LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE xviii (Centre for Urban Studies ed., 1964).
39. Id. at xviii–xix.
40. See id. at xxvii–xx.
41. See J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405–06 (2003) (asserting
that gentrification is good, on balance, for the poor and ethnic minorities).
42. See GLASS ET AL., supra note 38, at xviii.
43. See Sandra Feder, Stanford Professor’s Study Finds Gentrification Disproportionately Affects
Minorities, STAN. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://news.stanford.edu/2020/12/01/gentrification-disproportionately-affects-minorities/ (noting that poor individuals who can no longer afford to live in gentrified areas move out and that among these displaced populations, members of Black communities
face fewer options of areas to relocate).
44. See Byrne, supra note 41 (noting how gentrification increases “the number of residents who
can pay taxes, purchase local goods and services, and support the city in state and federal political
processes”).
45. See id. (claiming that the “increases in the number of affluent and well-educated residents is
plainly good for cities”).
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and are forced to move, often without any support for this de facto
relocation.46 The process of devaluing Black creativity is a similar process.47
The irony is that sometimes these same creations are seen as less than: once
misappropriated by white artists who palm them off as their own, songs, dance
moves, art, and inventions (a creature of patent) have often experienced
increased value.48
If we are to learn anything from history, it is clear that racial
stratification—both de jure in the days of slavery and Jim Crow and de facto
via modern social structure—combined with the structural elements of the
copyright regime deny Black artists meaningful ownership of, and
compensation for, copyrighted works.49 Despite the facial neutrality of
copyright law, the experiences of creators vary widely based on race.50 Given
the rapid advance and state of the art of technological measures to engage in
authorized copying, adaptation, and distribution, possible harms increase
greatly in a web 3.0 world.51
46. See GLASS ET AL., supra note 38, at xviii–xix.
47. See Greene, supra note 4, at 370 (applying similar reasoning to the music industry). K.J.
Greene describes this phenomenon as follows: “Given the context of inferiority fostered by the
ideology of separation, it is likely that society would not generally value a work by a minority artist
as much as the same work by a white artist.” Id.
48. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 794
(2001) (“[Some cultural products] are devalued when appropriated by the majority culture.”).
Although outside the scope of this Article, a formidable body of scholarship excavates and critiques
cultural misappropriation globally. See, e.g., id. Scafidi explains that “[d]espite the tremendous
economic and social value of community-generated cultural products, the source communities have
little control over them.” Id. at 794 n.4 (noting an exception in the case of Native American cultural
products pursuant to the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-664, 104 Stat. 4462
(1990) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 305 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158–1159 to make illegal the misrepresentation
of goods as “Indian-produced”). See generally J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, A Sui Generis Regime for
Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 147 (2011); J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Protecting Culturally Identifiable Fashion: What Role for
GIs?, 14 FIU L. REV. 571 (2021); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001); Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic
Development: The Role of Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1 (2006); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Chidi Oguamanam, Local Knowledge as Trapped
Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 29
(2008); Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property and the Global Élites: An Introduction, 10
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2002); Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual
Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional
Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629 (2007).
49. See Greene, supra note 4, at 342.
50. See id. at 343 (arguing that “[t]he history of Black music in America demonstrates the
significant inequality of protection in the ‘race-neutral’ copyright regime”).
51. See Visual Artists’ Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1979 (1994) (noting that
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III. COPYRIGHT AND THE TERMINATION RIGHT
In this Part, I present the subject matter of copyright protection and the
nature and mechanics of the transfer termination right. Specifically, I examine
the history, purpose, and congressional intent of the right, as well as the
method and the complexities of timing of notice and termination.
Copyright automatically protects literary and artistic works fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and that are therefore capable of being copied
or otherwise exploited.52 Copyright subsists for the life of the author plus
seventy years after the author’s death.53 The right granted to an author is
referred to as a bundle of rights that consists of the exclusive right to copy,
adapt, distribute copies, and perform or display publicly.54 Section 106 also
makes clear that the author can also authorize others to exploit any or all rights
in the bundle.55 This occurs by means of transfer by grant or license to one
who presumably is better positioned to monetize the rights (an agent,
publisher, distributor, or other marketplace intermediary, for example).56
Although most creatives are inspired to create literary and artistic works
simply to express their creative spark, the Framers of the Constitution created
copyright law based on an economic incentive theory.57 However, the reality
that throughout United States history Black artists have received less
protection (or in some cases no protection) for their creative expression
undermines this theory.58 The point is made clearer when during the period

“digital technology makes it easier to manipulate existing works, which leads to new possibilities for
artists who can harness the technology, but also increases the potential for unauthorized alteration and
appropriation of copyrighted works”).
52. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
53. See § 302(a); see also How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-duration.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (“For an anonymous
work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years
from the year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever
expires first. For works first published prior to 1978, the term will vary depending on several
factors.”).
54. See § 106.
55. See id.
56. See Copyright Licensing, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/copyright/copyright-licensing/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (describing how copyright owners can license or assign
their exclusive copyright rights).
57. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (discussing the
original intent of the Framers). “[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” Id.
58. See Greene, supra note 4, at 378.
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of enslavement, a Black person herself was regarded as property and,
therefore, legally incapable of creating or owning property of her own.59 The
loss of generational wealth is presumably incalculable.60
Transfer includes assignments, exclusive licenses, and nonexclusive
licenses.61 Section 101 defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation,
or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license.”62 Regardless of any “agreement to the
contrary,” an author of a transfer made on or after January 1, 1978, can notify
the transferee of her intention to terminate the transfer and reclaim control of
her copyright.63 This termination right is codified in § 203 of the Act.64
Termination does not, however, apply in the case of a work made for hire.65
A work for hire, as the name suggests, is a literary or artistic work created
within the context of employment or one that is “specially ordered or
commissioned” from an independent contractor.66
A. The History of the Copyright Transfer Termination Right
Before 1976, Congress attempted to protect authors who had assigned
rights through a two-term system that created an initial term of copyright
followed by an automatic second term (the renewal term).67 Congress
believed that after the first term, authors and transferees would both have a
better idea of the actual value of the work and would negotiate for more
favorable terms or, in the alternative, the author could enter into agreements
with a new transferee or exploit the rights themselves.68
The problem is that transferees would often require, as a matter of course,
59. See Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motive in Intellectual Property Law (with Special
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 740–41 (2007) (discussing ownership of intellectual property created by Black people while enslaved).
60. See generally Greene, supra note 4, at 357–58.
61. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining various terms under the Act).
62. Id.
63. See § 203 (“Termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author”).
64. See id.
65. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 9, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 1, 3 (2012) (“However, the
termination provisions of the law do not apply to works made for hire.”).
66. See § 101; see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1989).
67. See 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
101–1401).
68. See id.
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that the author transfer both terms upfront.69 This wholesale rights acquisition
created an end-run around Congress’s intent.70 Publishers were the essential
gatekeeper to access to production, distribution, and exploitation of creativity,
especially in a pre-internet world because “authors generally had no option
but to assign their rights for both terms of protection.”71 The Supreme Court
upheld this disfavored practice in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons.72 As a result, Congress’s intent to confer the benefit of the renewal term
on authors and their heirs was, as one Supreme Court Justice remarked in Mills
Music, Inc. v. Snyder, “substantially thwarted.”73 The right was in name only
because it existed in law yet was illusory for all but the most well-positioned
copyright creators.74 So Congress went back to the drawing board.75 To avoid
the end-run rights grab practice under the new unitary system pursuant to the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress included the clause “notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary” to make clear the right is nonwaivable and
inalienable.76
Copyright transfer termination is not automatic.77 Rather, it is an
affirmative act that requires owners to follow precise notice and timing
requirements, explained more fully below.78 This was a compromise
advocated by copyright-intensive industries to limit automatic forfeiture.79 To
comport with the Berne Convention, Congress removed the copyright

69. See Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin, Copyright Termination and Loan-Out Corporations:
Reconciling Practice and Policy, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 55, 58 (2012) (discussing how authors
could recapture their copyright and thereby exploit its long-term value).
70. See id. (“[A]uthors with little bargaining power were often required to assign both the initial
and renewal copyright terms to publishers in advance.”).
71. See Brian D. Caplan, Navigating US Copyright Termination Rights, WIPO MAG. (Aug. 2012),
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2012/04/article_0005.html.
72. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Whitmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Moss & Basin, supra
note 69.
73. 469 U.S. 153, 185 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 186 (“By going further than necessary to effect the goal of promoting access to the
arts, the majority frustrates the congressional purpose of compensating authors who, when their works
were in their infancy, struck unremunerative bargains.”).
75. See Moss & Basin, supra note 69, at 58–59 (discussing that due to Congress’s intent being
“substantially thwarted,” the Copyright Act of 1976 was created to, among other things, address this
issue).
76. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5).
77. See Moss & Basin, supra note 69, at 60 (stating that “reversion through termination is not
automatic under the current Act”).
78. See id. (“Termination may only be effected through affirmative action.”).
79. See id. at 59–60 (discussing how the Copyright Act of 1976 was intended to be “a practical
compromise” that recognized “the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved”).
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formalities that rights holders were required to comply with not only to obtain
copyright protection of their work but also to maintain copyright protection.80
“The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act explained that ‘[a]
provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of
authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value
until it has been exploited.’”81 Congress noted further that “the unequal
bargaining power burdening authors resulted not only from their status, but
also from the inherent impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has
been exploited.”82
I argue that the termination provisions serve as a de facto formality that
impedes the ability of all but the most well-resourced, well-represented, and
savvy creatives.83 It is only those privileged authors who will have the
wherewithal and resources to successfully navigate the notice and termination
rules to reclaim their copyrights.84 Given these clear and prescient concerns,
the tortuous twists and turns that stand between author and transferee fall far
short of Congress’s intent to provide authors with a guaranteed opportunity to
take a second bite of the proverbial apple.85
B. The Mechanics of Notice and Termination
Since 2013, artists from all entertainment industry sectors have
successfully served notices and terminated assignments and exclusive licenses
that were thought at the time of contract to be irrevocable and perpetual.86

80. See Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright from Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
565, 585 (1995). “Formalities have long been a hallmark of the American copyright system. Since
its eighteenth-century origins, our law has required various steps to be taken in order to obtain and
enjoy federal copyright protection.” Id. at 566.
81. Moss & Basin, supra note 69, at 59 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 124 (1976)).
82. Id. at 80.
83. See generally Dylan Gilbert, Meredith Rose & Alisa Valentin, Making Sense of the Termination Right: How the System Fails Artists and How To Fix It, Public Knowledge (Dec. 2019),
https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2019-12/apo-nid271181.pdf (discussing that termination rights can combine with other formalities to create significant hurdles that are difficult to overcome without expensive legal representation).
84. See id. at ii (“Creators who lack the financial resources or name recognition needed to engage
in lengthy legal and PR battles may be unable to even reach the doorstep of termination.”).
85. See id. at i–ii (discussing how “something which is supposed to be an inalienable right” is in
reality “complex to execute” and entangles artists “in lengthy and expensive litigation,” which few of
them can afford).
86. See Q&A with Copyright Grant Termination Expert Lisa A. Alter, Esq., AUDITRIX, INC. (Mar.
30, 2014), http://blog.auditrix.net/2014/03/q-with-copyright-grant-termination.html (“An increasing
number of authors are exercising their termination rights. Those who do not may simply be unaware
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As noted, Congress included the phrase “notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary” to avoid the results under the Copyright Act of 1909, where
authors were forced to transfer both the initial and renewal terms to
transferees, forever losing control of their rights.87 This language forces the
parties to the negotiating table after decades have passed and the value of the
work has become clearer, placing the author in a stronger bargaining
position.88 Sufficient time has also passed for the transferee to exploit the
work and, presumably, to receive a reasonable return on their investment.89
Owners of copyrighted works created on or after January 1, 1978, were
first empowered to begin terminating any transfers of those works on January
1, 2013.90 However, notice of termination must be served no earlier than ten
years and no later than two years before the effective date of termination (the
notice period).91 The notice of the effective date of termination must be in
writing and recorded with the Copyright Office before the effective date of
termination.92 However, the statute does not prescribe a set form of notice.93
Although an author cannot waive her termination right, she can forfeit it if she
fails to terminate in an appropriate and timely way.94 “In practice, many
grants of books, screenplays, and other creative works include the right of
of the opportunity.”); Eriq Gardner, Rock Band Boston Involved in Copyright Termination Fight,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 21, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/rock-bandboston-involved-copyright-430177 (“Many song artists have done the math and filed termination
notices to reclaim their works. Now come[] the lawsuits.”).
87. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5); see also supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
88. See Arnold P. Lutzker et al., Copyright Office Proposes Rules To Modernize Recordation of
Termination Notices, LUTZKER & LUTZKER LLP (June 23, 2020), https://www.lutzker.com/copyrightoffice-proposes-rules-to-modernize-recordation-of-termination-notices/ (discussing the effect of Copyright Act of 1976 termination provisions on bargaining power between parties).
89. See id. (“[T]he termination right attempts to correct the bargaining imbalance between the author and grantee while also allowing authors to enjoy the later economic success of their works.”).
90. See §§ 203(a), 203(a)(3) (“Termination of the grant may be effected at any time . . . beginning
at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant.”).
91. See § 203(a)(4)(A) (“[T]he notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years
before [the effective date of the termination].”).
92. See § 203(a)(4).
93. See id. (instituting some notice requirements but allowing the Register of Copyrights to
prescribe the form of notice “by regulation”). For example, for a transfer that occurred on January 1,
1980, the notice period began in 2005 and ended in 2018 (13 years). See id. (describing notice rules).
The termination window opened in 2015 and will close at the end of 2020 (5 years). See § 203(a)(3)
(describing termination rules).
94. See Margo E. Crespin, A Second Bite of the Apple: A Guide to Terminating Transfers Under
Section 203 of the Copyright Act, AUTHOR’S GUILD (2005), https://www.authorsguild.org/memberservices/legal-services/terminating-transfers/ (discussing the result of failing to meet statutory requirements for termination).
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publication, and therefore will not be eligible for termination until thirty-five
years have passed from the date of publication,” which in many instances will
“be up to several years after the date” the parties executed the publishing
agreement.95 If a work “is not published within five years of the date the grant
is executed, the grant may be terminated forty years from the date of
execution.”96
The court’s decision in Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis was one of the first
to interpret the copyright termination provisions applicable to post-1977
grants.97 That case involved Village People member Victor Willis’s right to
recapture control of thirty-three copyrighted songs Willis co-authored,
including Y.M.C.A., Go West, and In the Navy.98 In January 2011 (honoring
the requisite two years’ notice), thirty-three years after Willis’s transfer of the
lyrics he authored, he served a notice to terminate as of 2013 on Can’t Stop
Productions, Inc., the assignee, and was ultimately successful in his
termination bid.99
Upon termination, all U.S. copyright interests conveyed under the initial
grant revert to the original grantor.100 Rights in any derivative works prepared
as a result of the original transfer and prior to its termination also remain
unaffected.101 Once rights are recaptured, the original creator may prepare or
authorize others to prepare new derivative works.102
Because Victor Willis and similarly situated artists reclaimed control of
their respective copyright interests during their lifetimes, they are free to
dispose of their copyrights, as intangible personal property, during their
lifetime in any way they choose.103 Or they can exercise their testamentary
freedom, a powerful stick in the bundle of property rights, to transfer property

95. Moss & Basin, supra note 69, at 62 n.29 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)).
96. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3), 304(c)(4)(A)).
97. See Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-01557-BTM-RBB, 2012 WL 1598043 (S.D. Cal.
May 7, 2012).
98. See id. at *1 (discussing the hit songs for which Willis sought reinstatement of copyright interests).
99. See id. at *1, *7 (dismissing Can’t Stop Productions’ claim for declaratory judgment that Willis
did not have vested copyright interests).
100. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 203(b) (stating that “upon . . . termination, all rights
under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author” or other person owning
the interest).
101. See § 203(b)(1).
102. See § 203(b)(1)–(2) (noting the effects of termination).
103. See § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law.”).
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at death.104 Testamentary transfers are integral to a creative’s ability to create
generational wealth and essential for Black creatives, in particular, to begin to
eradicate and overcome—not only the income—but the racial wealth gap in
America.105
IV. TERMINATION NOTICES DATASET STUDY
In this Part, I examine the pre-window fervor and speculation of
stakeholder commentators around the likely impact of § 203 terminations
prior to 2013 and the actual impact since 2013. Additionally, I identify and
consider a forecast of likely trends, as discussed in the Termination Notices
dataset study.106
Although copyrighted works are not required to be registered for rights to
exist,107 transfer termination notices are required to be in writing and filed with
the Copyright Office.108 The registration requirement ensures that a database
of termination information exists.109 Before the 2013 notice period window
opened, the comments and concerns of practitioners, commentators, and
stakeholders ran the gamut; but most opined that the impact would be
significant and dramatically impact how copyrighted works were exploited
thereafter.110
A great void existed, however, in a lack of aggregation and extrapolation
of the data to assess empirically driven conclusions and predictions until 2021
104. See id. (“The ownership of a copyright may be . . . bequeathed by will or pass as personal
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”)
105. See generally Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the
Black–White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/.
106. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (describing the results of studies based on two different datasets of copyright termination notice records).
107. See Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright Formalities:
Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How To Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459, 1467–68
(2013) (explaining how registration—a copyright formality required pursuant to the 1909 Act—is no
longer a condition precedent to a grant of rights).
108. See § 203(a)(4)(A) (“A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the
effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect.”).
109. See Notices of Termination, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/recordation/termination.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (outlining the procedures and requirements for
registrations that must be made with the U.S. Copyright Office).
110. See Richard Busch, The Battle over Copyright Termination—And the First Round Goes to . . .,
FORBES (June 12, 2012, 9:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbusch/2012/06/12/the-battleover-copyright-termination-and-the-first-round-goes-to/#76baafb82982 (referring to the date the first
round of § 203 terminations became effective). Busch summed up the then impending date of January
1, 2013, as “Judgment Day.” Id.
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when four authors completed an exhaustive excavation of the data in the first
large-scale study of copyright termination notice records from the U.S.
Copyright Office.111 The result is two new open-access datasets and evidence
of some insightful preliminary data.112 As I predicted in Statutory Heirs
Apparent?,113 the study shows a notable surge in interest in copyright transfer
terminations, led by some high-profile artists, as well as artist advocates, usergroups (for example, the gallery, library, archive, and museum sectors), and
policymakers (especially in the European Union, South Africa, and
Canada).114
Despite the availability of termination notices filed with the Copyright
Office, the database system itself has numerous flaws that make accessing and
analyzing the information quite difficult.115 For example, “[t]he paucity of
empirical research on the U.S. termination right may be a product of the
difficulty of accessing and analy[z]ing the data. [The data] is contained within
an ageing system[,] which can be difficult to [search].”116 In addition, the
search page itself “does not permit users to download multiple records at
once.”117 Nonetheless, the authors were able to construct datasets to deduce
activity volume and patterns and to begin to derive trends.118 They classified
the data into types of records, allowing for inconsistent recordation methods
and “poor metadata hygiene,” common for pro se filings, and “captured 3,306
§ 203 termination notice records, corresponding to 42,280 distinct titles.”119
Although the datasets are a welcomed access point to key termination

111. See Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison & K. Ross Powell, Copyright Registrations: Who, What,
When, Where, and Why, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2211, 2219–20 (2014) (“[T]he Copyright Office’s database
does not offer a bulk data download, instead only allowing users to find records by entering individual
search terms.”).
112. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 40). The study focused on both § 203 and §
304 notices, but the scope of this paper focuses on the former—those terminations beginning on or
after January 1, 2013. See id.
113. See Evans, supra note 10, at 297.
114. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 3). Reversion creates an opportunity for
aligned interests between creators and end-users to ensure access to, and enjoyment of, cultural
artifacts that rightsholders often lose interest in after a work’s commercial viability wanes. See id.
(manuscript at 3–4) (noting that “the unusual unity provides a rare opportunity to create meaningful
change”).
115. See id. (manuscript at 8–9).
116. Id. (manuscript at 8).
117. Id.
118. See id. (manuscript at 19) (discussing the results of the authors’ “preliminary descriptive analyses”).
119. See id. (manuscript at 15).
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data, they do have their limits.120 First, a termination notice is just that:
notice.121 Notice does not guarantee that the grant of rights will, in fact, be
terminated.122 In fact, they are often used to encourage bargaining, the type
envisioned by Congress when it enacted the termination right as a second bite
of the apple.123 Second, the notice may not be legally binding.124 Notices are
not required to be in a particular form, but they can be struck down or fail for
a variety of reasons.125 Third, in the vain of “garbage in, garbage out,” the
records are riddled, in some cases, with inaccuracies and inconsistencies.126
Fourth, the authors acknowledge that their data-gathering methodology may
not have captured all relevant data.127 Nonetheless, this Herculean effort is
formidable and serves as a valuable contribution to the empirical study of
copyright transfer terminations in the United States to benefit stakeholders
and policymakers around the world.128 The study findings focus on three
areas: (1) “[t]he number of notices filed, and how that has evolved over time”;
(2) “[t]he different types of works being subject to termination notices over
time”; and (3) “[c]haracteristics of the creators or heirs filing for
termination.”129

120. See id. (manuscript at 18–19) (discussing limitations to the datasets).
121. See id. (manuscript at 18) (describing other outcomes besides termination that might occur
after notice is given, such as “counter-notice”).
122. See id. (stating “a termination does not necessarily take place just because a termination notice
is issued” because the notice may be challenged or revoked).
123. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 83, at 10–11 (explaining that Congress sought to improve
bargaining power for authors by allowing them to “leverage the imminent threat of rights termination”).
124. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 18) (stating “recordation on the Catalog does
not make a termination notice legally binding” because “[t]he filing parties may have made critical
errors in the notices that render them unenforceable”).
125. See id. (discussing various ways notices can fail).
126. See id. (stating records can have typographical and grammatical errors as well as inconsistencies in the data itself).
127. See id. (“[W]hile we followed the search advice provided by the Copyright Office, our program
may not have captured every single relevant record or filtered out every irrelevant record.”).
128. See id. (manuscript at 4) (“This paper introduces two new datasets that make available virtually
complete data on termination notices filed in the [United States] between its institution in 1978 and
2020. It also sets out findings from our preliminary analysis of these data[] and suggests how they
might be put to further use by scholars, policymakers[,] and industry.”).
129. Id. (manuscript at 19).
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A. Number of Notices
The data show spikes in filings of § 203 termination notices in years 1978,
1988, and 2000.130 The authors observed “a gradual increase per year from
2003 (the first year in which those notices could be validly filed) until they
began increasing much more rapidly in 2010” but “a substantial drop-off in
the number of both § 203 notices issued and the number of titles subject to
them from 2016–2019.”131
B. Types of Works Subject to Termination
Performance art, especially musicals, “and texts accounted for the
greatest share of registered works in the registration database,”132
while“[s]ound recordings made up less than 5% of registrations, but more than
31% of the total works subject to termination notices.”133 “Works of
performing arts were also over-represented (42% of registrations; 66% of
works subject to § 203 termination notices).”134 However, “text works made
up almost 40% of registrations but less than 3% of works subject to
termination notices.”135 Finally, “[w]orks of visual arts accounted for 13% of
registered works (13%),” yet they were rarely “subject to termination notices
(0.04%).”136
C. Who Is Filing Termination Notices
The authors list the top ten creators by the number of titles subject to §
203 termination and the percentage of all titles subject to § 203 termination.137
The list is illuminating and begins with George Clinton, one of the most
sampled artists of all time (1413/2.49%).138 The second is the Philadelphia
130. See id. (“These data appear to show spikes in filings of § 203 termination notices (and the
numbers of works affected) in 1978, 1988, and 2000.”).
131. Id.
132. Id. (manuscript at 23).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (manuscript at 29) (illustrating Table 8, which concerns the “top 10 creators by number
of titles affected by termination notices under . . . § 203”).
138. See Bridgit Brown, George Clinton Has Produced Some of the Most Sampled Funk Beats in
the History of Music and Berklee College of Music Is Showing Him a Little Love, BAY STATE BANNER
(Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.baystatebanner.com/2012/02/06/george-clinton-has-produced-some-of-
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International Records duo, Kenny Gamble and Leon Huff (1136/2.69%).139
The authors conclude that the great majority of filings come from musicians
and songwriters in the music sector.140
Perhaps the most revealing—and yet daunting—conclusion the authors
make is that U.S. termination laws are of little value to artists across the
board.141 Without automatic reversion and a shorter period before authors can
even begin the process of termination, most of the value of the copyrights has
long been extracted before the notice period begins.142 The exceptions are the
truly exceptional artists with global recognition, star power, and perennial hits
(recall Victor Willis, Prince, and Anita Baker, discussed above).143 Although
“[t]he Copyright Office . . . initially proposed that the U.S. termination law
should operate automatically 25 years after transfer,” entertainment industry
lobbyists vehemently opposed this proposal and convinced Congress to accept
its version of the law’s draft.144 Unsurprisingly, the language was
substantially amended in ways that made the process unduly lengthy (not to
begin before thirty-five years), unreasonably complex (even for an intellectual
property lawyer), and extremely costly (tens of thousands of dollars for
attorney’s fees and, perhaps, court costs), with the ever-present threat of a
permanent loss of rights if the artist fails to comply.145
I argue that termination rights should operate automatically.146 I propose
the-most-sampled-funk-beats-in-the-history-of-music-and-berklee-college-of-music-is-showing-hima-little-love/; Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 29).
139. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 30).
140. See id. (manuscript at 31) (“These results suggest musicians and songwriters . . . file termination notices in respect of the largest number of works.”).
141. See id. (manuscript at 38).
142. Cf. How Royalty Earnings Change over Time, ROYALTY EXCH. (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.royaltyexchange.com/blog/how-royalty-earnings-change-over-time (examining 5,000
songs over a period of eight years and finding that royalty earnings began falling after a period of three
years to a stable level mostly driven by streaming earnings).
143. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text (discussing Willis, Prince, and Baker, who all
exercised their copyright transfer termination rights).
144. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 38) (claiming that “the draft law was
substantially amended” after industry lobbying). William Patry explained that the author’s affirmative
duty to follow precisely the complex and confounding termination rules reflects a “weakening” agreed
to by “authors, distributors, the Copyright Office, and Congress.” William Patry, The Failure of the
American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 921 (1997).
Further, Patry explained that “[t]hese termination proposals were strongly objected to by distributors
and strongly defended by authors[] and became, in the words of the Copyright Office, ‘the most
explosive and difficult issue in the revision process.’” Id. (footnote omitted).
145. See Yuvaraj et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 38).
146. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 83, at ii–iv (proposing six solutions to the problems with the
Copyright Act, including making termination rights vest automatically).
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that programmable blockchains created to run smart contracts and
decentralized applications are viable and appropriate technological means to
provide this automation of performance and enforcement as a form of
decentralized autonomous termination.147 Additionally, non-fungible token
standards could be used to digitally represent verifiable, secure ownership,
increase liquidity markets, and allow artists to participate in secondary market
revenue opportunities, manage licensing, fan engagement, and avail
themselves of a range of monetization opportunities made possible by this
emerging technology.148
This proposal is both consistent with the Copyright Office’s original
focus on automatic reversion of rights and achievable with the current state of
the technological art.149 Despite blockchain’s origins in providing a peer-topeer cash system for cryptocurrencies, noted commentators aptly describe
blockchain technology as “an incorruptible digital ledger of economic
transactions that can be programmed to record not just financial transactions
but virtually everything of value.”150 Viewed through that more expansive
crypto-asset lens, programmable blockchains, smart contract code, and NFT
standards can ensure that all artists can fully realize the economic
opportunities created by transfer-termination rights, especially Black
creatives who historically lack access to the information, capital, and legal
representation necessary to successfully navigate the considerable barriers
that have and will continue to disenfranchise far too many Black artists.151

147. See infra Part V (introducing blockchain technology, smart contract code, and non-fungible
token standards).
148. See Tonya M. Evans, The Genesis of Creative Justice: Disintermediating Creativity, 26 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
149. See Chase A. Brennick, Termination Rights in the Music Industry: Revolutionary or Ripe for
Reform?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 786, 791–92 (2018) (discussing the history of reversion rights and how,
“[i]n the 1960s, the Copyright Office considered shifting copyright law . . . . The proposal generated
immediate opposition, with copyright transferees . . . arguing that reversions are paternalistic”). See
generally Michelle Adams, In with the New, but Out with the Old?, U. MIAMI L. REV. (Apr. 11, 2021),
https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/blockchain-smart-contracts/ (discussing the significant role that
smart contracts, cryptocurrency, NFTs, and other blockchain features will have in the future).
150. Nick Bawa, It’s Time To Explain Blockchain, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:45 AM) (emphasis
added),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/01/31/its-time-to-explainblockchain/?sh=1e3a1509621d (noting that technology gurus Don and Alex Tapscott provided this
comprehensive definition of blockchain).
151. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 83, at 3 (“Whatever policies Congress ultimately pursues, the
goal should be to create a system that both enables artists and the general public to understand how
the right functions and that helps artists effectively use their termination right as they see fit.”).

672

[Vol. 49: 649, 2022]

De-Gentrified Black Genius
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

V. AUTONOMOUS TERMINATIONS VIA BLOCKCHAIN, SMART CONTRACTS,
AND NFTS
In this Part, I discuss the role that blockchain technology, smart contract
code, and non-fungible token standards can play in automating codified
protections. Removing the educational and legalistic barriers to exercising
one’s termination rights and automating the transfer termination process
would ensure that all artists have actual—not theoretical—rights, especially
disenfranchised creatives victimized first by powerful industry intermediaries
and then by a legal process created by those same industry stakeholders to
protect industry, rather than creator, interests.152
A. Blockchains
Blockchains are databases of time-stamped, append-only digital
transaction information maintained by a decentralized (or distributed)
network of computers instead of one centralized server.153 Blockchains differ
from earlier versions of the world wide web that were fully centralized clientservers where information flowed from server to client computers.154 The
early decentralized web involved numerous mini client-servers, featuring endusers as both recipients of information and also creators and publishers.155
However, information is still largely siloed by three private, global
companies: Amazon, Microsoft, and Google.156
152. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 83, at i–ii (claiming that although the termination right is
“supposed to be an inalienable right,” termination is virtually nonexistent due to the problems that
“plague the system”).
153. See What Is Blockchain Technology?, LIQUID (Oct. 18, 2018), https://blog.liquid.com/what-isblockchain-technology (describing blockchain as a “distributed database that’s decentralized,” in
which “many computers or ‘nodes’ . . . connect,” that is “designed to be an ‘append-only’ data
structure” and include “timestamp as well as transaction data”). Blockchains record the sender,
receiver, and amount of every transaction, as well as balances in each wallet that interacts with the
blockchain. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1, 2, 6
(2008) (“The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without
information linking the transaction to anyone.”).
154. See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE 2, 16–17 (2018).
155. See id. at 16–17 (describing how by the turn of the twenty-first century, new peer-to-peer networks emerged where each participant in the network was both a supplier and consumer of resources).
156. See Mike Robuck, Report: Amazon, Microsoft and Google Account for Half of All Major
Hyperscale
Data
Centers,
FIERCE
TELECOM
(Jan.
27,
2021,
12:56
PM),
https://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/report-amazon-microsoft-and-google-account-for-half-allmajor-hyperscale-data-centers. The author explains: “Not surprisingly, the companies with the
broadest data center footprint are the leading cloud providers[:] Amazon, Microsoft, Google[,] and
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Blockchain protocols consist of a mix of existing technologies in a novel
way—namely, the internet, peer-to-peer networks, and public-private key
cryptography with digital signature.157 In addition to the append-only nature
of distributed ledgers, blockchains are disintermediated and borderless.158
Open-access blockchains are permissionless and fully transparent.159 The first
blockchain—the Bitcoin blockchain—was created by a pseudonymous person
or group of people named Satoshi Nakamoto in January 2009.160 Satoshi
created Bitcoin to facilitate a peer-to-peer digital cash system that was
verifiable, secure, and not beholden to any “trusted third party” (government
or bank, for example, to track and settle transactions).161
Although blockchain’s first use was to secure and record encrypted peerto-peer Bitcoin transactions and balances, distributed ledger technology has
proven to be a multipurpose technology with countless other potential
applications.162 Blockchains are useful in any industry that benefits from a
decentralized method of verifying and securing data, including copyrightintensive industries.163 Notable benefits related to copyright include the
administration and distribution of copyright-protected works.164 They can
also be an effective mechanism for enforcing the artist’s resale right as an
alternative to collective management organizations.165 The technology,
however, raises a host of questions and challenges that may arise from such

IBM. Each has 60 or more data center locations with at least three in each of the four regions of North
America, APAC, EMEA[,] and Latin America.” Id.
157. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 154, at 2–3.
158. See id. at 33.
159. See id. at 31.
160. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 153, at 8 (“We have proposed a system for electronic transactions
without relying on trust.”).
161. See id. at 1 (“What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof
instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need
for a trusted third party.”).
162. See Sebastian Pech, Copyright Unchained: How Blockchain Technology Can Change the
Administration and Distribution of Copyright Protected Works, 18 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,
2 (2020) (footnotes omitted) (“The underlying technology, blockchain, is not only supposed to
revolutionize the financial industry[] but also transform almost every part of our lives . . . .”).
163. See id. (claiming that blockchain could be useful for “real estate transactions, voting, car leasing and sales, supply chain management, and healthcare”).
164. See id. at 50 (stating that “blockchain technology can fundamentally change the traditional
structure of content administration and distribution to the benefit of right holders, exploiters, consumers, and the public”).
165. See Zhao, Fulfilling the Right To Follow: Using Blockchain To Enforce the Artist’s Resale
Right, 39 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 239, 268 (2021).
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use.166
B. The Ethereum Virtual Machine and Smart Contracts
In 2013, Vitalik Buterin released the Ethereum White Paper that
envisioned a different type of blockchain than the Bitcoin blockchain, one
designed to function as a virtual computer operating system capable of
running applications like a computer runs software programs.167 The
Ethereum Virtual Machine (or EVM), commonly known at that time as
Blockchain 2.0, launched in 2015.168 The EVM is powered by smart
contracts—bits of computer code that operate on “if, then” input/output
sequencing and serve as a powerful tool of disintermediation that automates
performance and enforcement of terms without the need for a trusted third
party to facilitate the transaction.169
Smart contracts170 are not a new concept. Nick Szabo first proposed fully
or partially self-executing, self-enforcing software code in 1994, which he
referred to as smart contracts.171 As a graduate of George Washington
University Law School, Szabo was well-versed in the language of the law.172
He used the term “contract” intentionally, although smart contracts do not
automatically qualify, as a matter of law, as legally enforceable agreements
that satisfy the elements of mutual assent (evidenced by an offer and

166. See Pech, supra note 162, at 1–2; see also DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 154, at 45–46
(highlighting the benefits and challenges of blockchain technology).
167. See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum Whitepaper, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/
(Oct. 29, 2021).
168. See Camila Russo, Sale of the Century: The Inside Story of Ethereum’s 2014 Premine,
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/07/11/sale-of-the-century-the-inside-story-ofethereums-2014-premine/ (Sept. 14, 2021, 2:29 AM).
169. See DANIEL T. STABILE, KIMBERLY A. PRIOR & ANDREW M. HINKES, DIGITAL ASSETS AND
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: U.S. LAW AND REGULATION 216 (2020).
170. See Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential
and Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potentialand-inherent-limitations/ (defining smart contracts). A smart contract is “computer code that
automatically executes all or parts of an agreement and is stored on a blockchain-based platform.” See
id.
171. See Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, PHOENTIC SCI., AMSTERDAM (1994),
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschoo
l2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html. Szabo is a computer scientist, legal scholar, and
graduate of George Washington University Law School. See Meet the Speakers, UNIV. ARK.,
https://blockchain.uark.edu/nick-szabo/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
172. See Meet the Speakers, supra note 171.
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acceptance), consideration, legality, and legal capacity.173
Szabo described smart contracts as “a computerized transaction protocol
that executes the terms of a contract.”174 The problem he sought to remedy
via smart contracts was primarily the cost of doing business globally.175 He
focused initially on the transactional friction found in persistent issues of
“jurisdiction, security, and trust” and the corresponding “costs of developing,
maintaining, and securing [business] relationships.”176 Further, he envisioned
a world that streamlined and revolutionized global business transactions by
replacing paper and people with open-source code.177
Szabo wanted to replace lawyers and other intermediaries in the
facilitation of business relationships, traditionally memorialized by written
agreement (although legally enforceable agreements can also be created by
oral agreement).178 A further goal was to make contract breach prohibitively
expensive.179 Szabo touted the benefits of smart contracts to include cost
savings for businesses, consumers, and public entities that seek to leverage
digitally autonomous agreements to replace traditional performance,
enforcement, and dispute resolution mechanisms with automated computer
algorithms.180 He centered his research at the intersection of economics and
cryptography to develop automated processes that encompassed “[t]he
173. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 1 (2021) (defining a contract as “an agreement which creates an
obligation” that involves “competent parties, subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of
agreement, and mutuality of obligation”); Szabo, supra note 171.
174. Szabo, supra note 171. Protocol is defined as “a set of rules or procedures for transmitting
data between electronic devices, such as computers.” See Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica,
Protocol, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/protocol-computer-science (last
visited Nov. 6, 2021).
175. See Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, SATOSHI
NAKAMOTO INST. (1997), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/formalizing-securing-relationships/ (discussing how smart contracts may prompt another revolution in global business).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. (“The basic idea behind smart contracts is that many kinds of contractual clauses (such
as collateral, bonding, delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in the hardware and
software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract expensive (if desired, sometimes
prohibitively so) for the breacher.”). This goal is contrasts with the role of efficient breach in contract
jurisprudence. See generally Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
777, 777 (2012) (asserting that “efficient breach theory, properly understood, is not inconsistent with
parties’ complying with their deontological obligations”).
180. See Szabo, supra note 171 (“Smart contracts reduce mental and computational transaction
costs, imposed by either principals, third parties, or their tools.”). See generally Zachary L. Catanzaro
& Robert Kain, The Revolution Will Be Memorialized: Selected Blockchain-Based Smart Contract
Use Cases, 49 FLA. BAR J. 52, 52 (2020).

676

[Vol. 49: 649, 2022]

De-Gentrified Black Genius
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

contractual phases of search, negotiation, commitment, performance, and
adjudication,” with a decided “emphasis on performance.”181
In the same way that smart contract code can automate contract
performance and enforcement and disintermediate centralized finance, it can
replace manual copyright transfer termination processes to remove artificial
formality-like codified barriers to the full enjoyment and commercial
exploitation of a copyrighted work.182 Congress justified the termination right
“on both economic and morals grounds” as giving protection to artists who
transferred rights early in their careers before establishing themselves or
having a clear picture of the value of their creativity.183 In an age where highvalue intellectual and digital property presents a new means for
disenfranchised artists to achieve economic gains in this generation and the
next, it is critically important to discover ways to leverage decentralized and
automated algorithmic processes to disintermediate creativity and de-gentrify
Black genius.
C. Non-Fungible Tokens
Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are cryptographically secured assets used to
establish ownership and control over another asset.184 Because of projects like
CryptoKitties,185 NBA Top Shot,186 and CryptoPunks,187 NFTs are currently
most associated with digital art and collectibles by means of URL reference
to the digital asset stored via a decentralized storage system like the
Interplanetary File System (IPFS).188 Unlike their fungible cryptocurrency
181. Szabo, supra note 171.
182. See, e.g., Pech, supra note 162, at 37 (“By using smart contracts, the transfer of rights can be
executed directly between right holders and potential users, like exploiters or consumers. A right
holder can determine price and other conditions in advance, and a potential user can obtain these rights
without any further negotiation.”).
183. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 83, at 10–11.
184. See Jeff Neasmith, 6 Industries that NFT’s Are Disrupting, TROON TECHS. (June 29, 2021),
https://troontechnologies.com/6-industries-that-nfts-are-disrupting/ (“Non-fungible tokens or NFTs
are cryptographic assets on blockchain with unique identification codes and metadata that distinguish
them from each other.”).
185. See CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
186. See NBA TOP SHOT, https://nbatopshot.com/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
187. See CryptoPunks, LARVA LABS, https://www.larvalabs.com/cryptopunks (last visited Nov. 6,
2021).
188. See Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography, and Copyright, 47 AIPLA Q.J. 219, 262
n.222 (2019) (“The IPFS is a P2P hypermedia protocol designed to make the web faster, safer, and
more open. . . . The four problems IPFS endeavors to solve are: (1) the inefficiency and expense of
the HTTP [i]nternet protocol; (2) the daily destruction of [i]nternet history; (3) to halt and counteract
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counterparts, NFTs are verifiably unique.189 Additionally, NFTs provide the
holder the ability to sell or otherwise transfer that token with a digital
signature.190 Each copyright is also unique, and ownership of a real-world
asset is possible by “tokenizing” the asset to be managed and exploited as an
NFT.191 However, one of the important (but limiting) characteristics of NFTs
is their indivisibility.192 Nonetheless, technology to enable fractionalized
NFTs that permit divisibility (and dramatically increase liquidity) is on the
rise.193
A relatable way to understand the relationship between the non-fungible
token and the referenced asset the token represents is to consider the
relationship between a deed to a house and the house itself.194 The deed is not
the house.195 However, the deed is the way the owner of record can evidence
ownership to exercise control and exploit the requisite rights and privileges.196
the hyper-centralization of the current [i]nternet’s current iteration; and (4) to enable resilient networks
that are not wholly dependent on ‘[i]nternet backbone connectivity.’”).
189. See NFTs: Redefining Digital Ownership and Scarcity, SOTHEBY’S (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://www.sothebys.com/en/articles/nfts-redefining-digital-ownership-and-scarcity (“Non-fungible
tokens . . . are verifiably scarce and unique.”).
190. See Robyn Conti & John Schmidt, What You Need To Know About Non-Fungible Tokens
(NFTs), FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/nft-non-fungible-token/ (May 14, 2021,
12:17 PM) (noting that each NFT “has a digital signature that makes it impossible for NFTs to be
exchanged for or equal to one another”).
191. See generally Real-World Asset Tokenization: A New Form of Asset Ownership, REALT,
https://realt.co/real-world-asset-tokenization-a-new-form-of-asset-ownership/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2022) (“Asset tokenization refers to the act of turning the ownership of a real-world item into a digital
token.”).
192. See Diego Geroni, Understanding the Attributes of Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs),
101BLOCKCHAINS (Sept. 1, 2021), https://101blockchains.com/nft-attributes/ (“One of the foremost
traits of non[-]fungible tokens refers to indivisibility. . . . Indivisibility implies that you cannot divide
an NFT into smaller tokens, and you need to purchase the whole NFT for owning an item.”).
193. See, e.g., Brady Dale, NFT Rally Paves Way for Fractionalization and Derivatives, DEFIANT
(Aug. 24, 2021), https://thedefiant.io/nfts-fractionalization-derivatives/ (“Fractional.art turns one NFT
into a set of ERC-20 tokens with built in rules around coordinating a sale of the FT.”). Fractional.art
is a company that facilitates this process by issuing ERC-20 (fungible) tokens as ownership units of
an ERC-721 or other non-fungible token standards. See id.; FRACTIONAL.ART, https://fractional.art/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2021). Numerous startups are entering the fractionalized NFT space. See id. See
generally Jamie Redman, Breaking NFTs to Pieces: These 4 Projects Are Fractionalizing Grimes,
Banksy, Cryptopunk NFTs, BITCOIN.COM (July 30, 2021), https://news.bitcoin.com/breaking-nfts-topieces-these-4-projects-are-fractionalizing-grimes-banksy-cryptopunk-nfts/.
194. See generally Teo Spengler, What Does the Deed to a House Mean?, SF GATE, https://homeguides.sfgate.com/deed-house-mean-95428.html (Dec. 27, 2018) (explaining that “[i]n a typical
home-sale situation, both the seller and homebuyer sign the [deed] agreeing to the transfer of the
property”).
195. See id. (“A deed is evidence of a homeowner’s rights to a home.”).
196. See, e.g., Property Ownership and Deed Recording, CAL. STATE BD. EQUALIZATION 1, 4,
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In addition, like a deed, an NFT’s transactional history is recorded.197
However, that recordation is done in a far more secure manner—the
transactions are recorded (in nonproprietary scenarios) on public,
permissionless, immutable digital ledgers (blockchains).198
NFTs offer provable ownership and provable scarcity.199 They also
increase opportunities for liquidity (as unique assets tend to be more illiquid)
and access to global markets.200 In light of the historical imbalance of
copyright ownership and monetization noted herein, these nascent
technologies present new opportunities to level the playing field for all artists,
especially those who have been systematically prevented from full and
meaningful access to, and participation in, capital markets born of property
created with the mind.201
VI. CONCLUSION
Often poor economic conditions, discriminatory practices,
misappropriation, and unscrupulous representation have led to
unconscionable deals (even by music industry standards) that have left even
the most prolific and successful artists destitute and indebted, or simply with
no attribution, compensation, or deal.202
However, a decentralized
autonomous termination right could level the negotiating playing field,
https://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/Ownership_DeedRecording.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2021)
(“When properly executed, delivered and accepted, a deed transfers title to real property from one
person (the grantor) to another person (the grantee).”).
197. See Investing Trends 101: What Are NFTs?, ALLY (June 9, 2021), https://www.ally.com/doit-right/investing/what-is-an-nft/ (stating that “an NFT’s entire transaction history is recorded and
available for public viewing”).
198. See John Wanguba, Are NFTs the New Paradigm for Intellectual Property Assets?, CRYPTO
VIBES (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.cryptovibes.com/blog/2021/08/18/nft-intellectual-property-assets/ (noting that an NFT’s transactional history is recorded “on the blockchain, a distributed digital
ledger that supports immutable records of transactions”).
199. See Has Crypto Entered “NFT Summer”?, COINBRIEFS (Aug. 1, 2021), https://www.coinbriefs.com/2021/08/01/has-crypto-entered-nft-summer/ (asserting that NFTs “offer provable scarcity
and ownership by recording data on a blockchain”).
200. See Oliver Dale, Drops: Unlocking Liquidity in Liquidity-Starved NFT Art & Collectibles Market, BLOCKONOMI (Sept. 3, 2021), https://blockonomi.com/drops-guide/ (highlighting that the art and
collectibles market needs an increase in liquidity for NFTs because “[h]aving access to adequate liquidity is essential for any financial market”).
201. See How These Black Creatives Are Cashing in on NFTs, POCIT, https://peopleofcolorintech.com/front/how-these-black-creatives-are-cashing-in-on-nfts/ (quoting NFT artist Andre
O’Shea as saying, “As a Black artist, NFTs means leveling the playing field and taking the keys away
from traditional gatekeepers in the art world”).
202. See Greene, supra note 4, at 357–58, 391–92.
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neutralize the impact of predatory and discriminatory practices, remove rentseeking gatekeepers, and give Black artists a true second bite at the proverbial
apple.203
With an automated, decentralized, and de-gentrified system, these artists
can finally raise a proverbial fist and achieve true entrepreneurial and
economic power by successfully leveraging their rights early in a creative
work’s life cycle and then confidently reclaiming copyright decades later after
the work has had a sufficient opportunity to prove its value and worth.204
Aspirational, but attainable via decentralized autonomous copyright
termination.205

203. See Samraweet Yohannes, Power Imbalance in the Art World Gets a Shake Up Thanks to
NFTs, CBC (Mar. 12, 2021, 3:44 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/spark/power-imbalance-in-the-artworld-gets-a-shake-up-thanks-to-nfts-1.5941280 (describing how NFTs are leveling the playing field
and allowing artists to take control of their sales, which has been economically democratizing and
beneficial for Black artists).
204. See NFTs Break Barriers, Create Community for Struggling Black Artists, BLACKINFOTODAY
(Sept. 30, 2021), https://blackinfotoday.com/nfts-break-barriers-create-community-for-strugglingblack-artists/ (illustrating how “[t]he arrival of the cryptocurrency boom created a new growth sector
that allowed [Black] artists to have more ownership over their works and increase their earning potential using NFTs to create original pieces”).
205. See Tonya M. Evans, Decentralized Autonomous Copyright Termination (forthcoming 2022).
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